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Creators/Authors contains: "Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy"

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  1. ; ; (, NeurIPS)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available December 5, 2026
  2. ; ; (, NeurIPS)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available December 5, 2026
  3. ; ; ; ; ; (, PMLR)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 19, 2026
  4. ; ; ; (, AISTATS 2025)
    Individuals often aim to reverse undesired outcomes in interactions with automated systems, like loan denials, by either implementing system-recommended actions (recourse), or manipulating their features. While providing recourse benefits users and enhances system utility, it also provides information about the decision process that can be used for more effective strategic manipulation, especially when the individuals collectively share such information with each other. We show that this tension leads rational utility-maximizing systems to frequently withhold recourse, resulting in decreased population utility, particularly impacting sensitive groups. To mitigate these effects, we explore the role of recourse subsidies, finding them effective in increasing the provision of recourse actions by rational systems, as well as lowering the potential social cost and mitigating unfairness caused by recourse withholding. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 5, 2026
  5. ; ; ; (, AISTATS)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 5, 2026
  6. ; ; ; (, ICLR)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 28, 2026
  7. ; ; (, The Journal of Mathematical Sociology)
    Calling to report crime represents public cooperation with the police. When rational individuals are predicted to report (and when not) is still poorly understood. We study an interdependent security game under threat of a costly event that can only occur once or is perceived as so costly that the threat of the event occurring more than once is (in foresight) perceived as no more costly than the event occurring only once. Our analysis suggests how the interactions among the benefits, costs and neighborhood effects of police response might affect reporting. When there is spatial contagion of crime, rational individuals may choose to report when more of their neighbors report. When there is spatial contagion of deterrence, the relationship is reversed. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 3, 2026
  8. ; ; ; ; ; (, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 16, 2026
  9. ; ; ; ; ; (, IEEE)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 12, 2026
  10. ; ; ; ; ; (, SIAM)
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 3, 2026