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Creators/Authors contains: "Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy"

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  9. The increasing automation of high-stakes decisions with direct impact on the lives and well-being of individuals raises a number of important considerations. Prominent among these is strategic behavior by individuals hoping to achieve a more desirable outcome. Two forms of such behavior are commonly studied: 1) misreporting of individual attributes, and 2) recourse, or actions that truly change such attributes. The former involves deception, and is inherently undesirable, whereas the latter may well be a desirable goal insofar as it changes true individual qualification. We study misreporting and recourse as strategic choices by individuals within a unified framework. In particular, we propose auditing as a means to incentivize recourse actions over attribute manipulation, and characterize optimal audit policies for two types of principals, utility-maximizing and recourse-maximizing. Additionally, we consider subsidies as an incentive for recourse over manipulation, and show that even a utility-maximizing principal would be willing to devote a considerable amount of audit budget to providing such subsidies. Finally, we consider the problem of optimizing fines for failed audits, and bound the total cost incurred by the population as a result of audits. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available August 22, 2024
  10. Group-fair learning methods typically seek to ensure that some measure of prediction efficacy for (often historically) disadvantaged minority groups is comparable to that for the majority of the population. When a principal seeks to adopt a group-fair approach to replace another, the principal may face opposition from those who feel they may be harmed by the switch, and this, in turn, may deter adoption. We propose that a potential mitigation to this concern is to ensure that a group-fair model is also popular, in the sense that, for a majority of the target population, it yields a preferred distribution over outcomes compared with the conventional model. In this paper, we show that state of the art fair learning approaches are often unpopular in this sense. We propose several efficient algorithms for postprocessing an existing group-fair learning scheme to improve its popularity while retaining fairness. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed postprocessing approaches are highly effective in practice. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 27, 2024